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Via e-mail and U.S . mail 
Derek J. Robinson, BRAC Environmental Coordinator 
Department of the Navy 
Base Realignment and Closure Program Management Office West 
33000 Nixie Way, Building 50, Suite 207 
San Diego, CA 92147 
Re: Comments from Greenaction for Health and Environmental 
Justice Regarding Navy' s Draft Addendum to Five-Year 
Review (Evaluation of Radiological Remedial Goals for Soil, 
Hunters Point Naval Shipyard) 
Dear Mr. Robinson: 
On August 8, 2019, the Department of the Navy issued a Draft Addendum to 
the Five-Year Review, enclosing an Evaluation of Radiological Remedial Goals for 
Soil at the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard ("HPNS"), and provided a 30-day period for 
both the public and regulatory agencies to review and comment on the document. 
This letter, submitted on behalf of Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice 
("Greenaction"), contains comments regarding the Navy' s Draft Addendum. In its 
Fourth Five-Year Review, the Navy stated that it would issue a Draft Addendum to 
evaluate the long-term protectiveness of the Remediation Goals for soil, and would 
prepare responses to regulatory agency comments and a responsiveness summary to 
comments from the public. NA VF AC's Final Fourth Five-Year Review at 7-3 (July 
2019) (hereafter "Fourth FYR"). We request the Navy to provide a written response 
to these comments when it finalizes the Draft Addendum. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
1. Five-Year Review 
Section 121(c) ofthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") requires the Navy, as the lead agency for HPNS, to 
prepare a review of the remedial action at HPNS "no less often than each 5 years after 
the initiation of such remedial action to assure that human health and the environment 
are being protected by the remedial action being implemented." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c). 
Pursuant to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
("NCP"), the lead agency must conduct a five-year review " [i]f a remedial action is 
selected that results in hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants remaining at 
the site above levels that allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure." 40 
C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(4)(ii). 
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The "purpose of a five-year review is to evaluate the implementation and 
performance of a remedy in order to determine if the remedy is or will be protective of 
human health and the environment." Comprehensive Five-Year Review Guidance at 
1-1, OSWER No. 9355.7-038-P, EPA 540-R-01-007 (June 2001) (hereafter 
"Comprehensive FYR Guidance"). For federal facilities such as HPNS subject to 42 
U.S.C. § 9620, five-year reviews are conducted by the Federal agency or department 
that has jurisdiction over the site, "but EPA retains final authority over whether the 
five-year reviews adequately address the protectiveness of remedies." Comprehensive 
FYR Guidance at 2-5. 
2. Acceptable Exposure Levels for Remedial Actions 
As the D.C. Circuit explained: "[w]hen EPA develops objectives for a 
remedial action at a site, it selects a remedial goal that 'establish[es] acceptable 
exposure levels that are protective ofhuman health." State of Ohio v. U.S. E.P.A., 
997 F.2d 1520, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing NCP at 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)). 
According to the NCP: 
For known or suspected carcinogens, acceptable exposure levels are 
generally concentration levels that represent an excess upper bound 
lifetime cancer risk to an individual ofbetween 10-4 and 10-6 using 
information on the relationship between dose and response. The 1 o-6 
risk level shall be used as the point of departure for determining 
remediation goals for alternatives when ARARs are not available or 
are not sufficiently protective because of the presence of multiple 
contaminants at a site or multiple pathways of exposure. 
40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (emphasis added). "A 104 risk subjects the 
surrounding population to an increased cancer risk of 1 in 10,000. A I o-6 risk subjects 
the surrounding population to an increased cancer risk of 1 in 1,000,000." State of 
Ohio, 997 F.2d at 1533. 
In the Preamble to the NCP, EPA stated: "By using 10"6 as the point of 
departure, EPA intends that there be a preference for setting remediation goals at the 
more protective end of the range, other things being equal." 55 Fed. Reg. 8,666, 8,718 
(March 8, 1990). EPA explained the resulting process as follows: 
The use of 1 o-6 expresses EPA's preference for remedial actions that 
result in risks at the more protective end of the risk range, but this does 
not reflect a presumption that the final remedial action should attain 
such a risk level. Factors related to exposure, uncertainty and technical 
limitations may justify modification of initial cleanup levels that are 
based on the 1 o-6 risk level. The ultimate decision on what level of 
protection will be appropriate depends on the selected remedy, which is 
based on the criteria described in [40 C.F.R.] § 300.430(e)(9)(iii). 
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55 Fed. Reg. at 8,718. 
B. The Nayy's Fourth Five-Year Review and Draft Addendum 
As the Navy acknowledged, a five-year review is required in this case because 
ongoing and completed remedial actions have left contaminants in place at HPNS 
above concentrations that would allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure. 
Fourth FYR at 1-2. In the Fourth FYR, the Navy stated that "a significant portion of 
the radiological survey and remediation work completed to date was not reliable 
because of manipulation and/or falsification of data by one of its radiological 
contractors." Id. at 7-3. Consequently, the Navy did not complete a long-term 
protectiveness evaluation of the radiological Remediation Goals in the Fourth FYR. 
Id. Instead, the Navy proposed to issue this Draft Addendum to evaluate the long-
term protectiveness of the Remediation Goals for soil using two models: (1) 
RESRAD-ONSITE ("RESRAD"); and (2) EPA's Preliminary Remediation Goal 
("PRG") Calculator for radiation risk to human health. Id. 1 
The Draft Addendum enclosed a Battelle report dated August 7, 2019, which 
was entitled "Hunters Point Naval Shipyard - Estimated Excess Cancer Risks and 
Dose Equivalent Rates from Resident Exposures to Radionuclide-Containing Soils 
Report" (hereafter "Battelle Report"). Table 1 of the Battelle Report lists current soil 
Remediation Goals from the 2006 HPNS Action Memorandum for 11 Radionuclides 
of Concern. Battelle Report at 3. Footnote 2 to Table 1 states that the current soil 
Remediation Goal for Radium-226 "is 1.0 pCi/g above background based on an 
agreement with the EPA." Id. at 3, Table 1, n.2. 
The Battelle Report claims that the Remediation Goals presented in Table 1 
were intended to be ''the most conservative available and are added to the site- and 
radionuclide-specific background." Id. at 3. These Remediation Goals "were derived 
considering the 1991 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decay-corrected 
preliminary remediation goals (PRG) (EPA, 1991), past action memoranda, an 
agreement with EPA for radium (Ra)-226 f 26Ra) and the 2004 Historical Radiological 
Assessment (HRA)." Id. 
II. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS 
The Draft Addendum to the Fourth FYR, which is intended to evaluate and 
determine if the HPNS remedy is and will be protective of human health and the 
environment, comes at an opportune moment. The Navy has recently determined that 
a significant portion of the radiological survey and remediation work completed to 
date at HPNS was not reliable because one of its radiological contractors manipulated 
1 A lead agency should complete a five-year review addendum for a remedy when the 
protectiveness determination was deferred in a prior five-year review in order to 
collect additional information. See Five-Year Reviews, Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs) and Answers at 2, OSWER 9355.7-21. 
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and/or falsified data. This HPNS survey and remediation work will now need to be 
redone by the Navy and its new contractors. In its comments on the draft Fourth FYR, 
EPA emphasized the need for the Navy, as part of the protectiveness determinations 
required in the Fourth FYR, to conduct an updated review of the remedial goals in the 
Record of Decision ("ROD") for each Parcel to determine whether the remedy, upon 
completion, will be protective of human health. Therefore, the Draft Addendum to the 
Fourth FYR affords the Navy the opportunity to reevaluate its remedial goals to 
determine whether they are protective. 
Instead, the Navy has ignored this opportunity to chart a new course for the 
HPNS remedy. The Navy failed to conduct an evaluation of the ROD's radiological 
remediation goals for soil. As a consequence, the Draft Addendum simply accepted, 
without any further review or evaluation, the Remediation Goals adopted in the 
Navy's 2006 Action Memorandum. The Navy failed to consider adoption of EPA's 
current Preliminary Remediation Goals for radionuclides, which are 897 times more 
protective than the Navy's Remediation Goal for Radium-226, a primary radionuclide 
of concern at HPNS. Furthermore, in the risk calculations included in the Draft 
Addendum, the Navy failed to take into account that radionuclide risks are not 
estimated based on an individual radionuclide or radionuclide decay chains, but are 
instead the sum of the risks from all radionuclides. Moreover, the Navy also failed to 
consider the risk posed by the consumption of homegrown produce. Despite ignoring 
this risk, the Navy's own calculations show that the combined risk of exposure to 
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 exceeds the upper bound lifetime cancer risk to an 
individual of 1 X 1 o-4 established under the NCP to protect human health. If the risks 
from the consumption of homegrown produce are included, the combined exposure to 
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 would subject future residents at HPNS to an increased 
cancer risk of 1.52 in 1 ,000, which exceeds the NCP' s protective standard by an order 
of magnitude. 
Under these circumstances, the Navy's Remediation Goals are not protective 
of human health. Consequently, consistent with the NCP and EPA guidance, 
Greenaction urges the Navy to: (1) adopt EPA's current Preliminary Remediation 
Goals for the 11 Radionuclides of Concern at HPNS; and (2) amend the RODs for 
HPNS Parcels to ensure that the remedies can meet the revised, more protective 
remediation goals. In addition, Greenaction requests that the Navy stop its 
unwarranted reliance on soil covers and land use restrictions in the remediation of soil 
contaminated with radiological waste. Instead of leaving contaminated soil on site, 
the Navy must conduct a thorough radiological survey at HPNS, and remove and 
properly dispose ofHPNS soil contaminated with radiological waste. Finally, 
Greenaction requests the Navy to revise its Protectiveness Determinations in its Fourth 
FYR to properly characterize the protectiveness of its remedies. 
III. DISCUSSION OF COMMENTS 
A. The Nayy Should Revise Its Soil Remediation Goals to Adopt EPA's 
Current Residential Preliminary Remediation Goals for Soil. 
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In the preamble to the final NCP, EPA stated its policy that it will not reopen 
remedy selection decisions contained in a ROD unless a "new or modified 
requirement calls into question the protectiveness of the selected remedy." 55 Fed. 
Reg. at 8,757. The preamble explained that "a policy of freezing ARARs at the time 
of ROD signing will not sacrifice protection of human health and the environment 
because the remedy will be reviewed for protectiveness every five years, considering 
new or modified requirements at that point, or more frequently, if there is reason to 
believe that the remedy is no longer protective of health and environment." ld. at 
8,758. In order to assess the protectiveness of a remedy in a five-year review, the lead 
agency should examine whether "the exposure assumptions, toxicity data, cleanup 
levels, and remedial action objectives (RAOs) used at the time of the remedy selection 
[are] still valid." Comprehensive FYR Guidance at 4-1. For an assumption based on a 
clean-up level, the lead agency should ask the following two questions: "What is the 
basis for each cleanup level identified in the ROD (e.g., risk-based or promulgated 
standards as ARARs )? Have there been changes to the basis of the cleanup levels?" 
ld. at 4-5. 
In the Fourth FYR, the Navy stated: 
The Navy is planning to evaluate the radiological RGs identified in 
the RODs using current guidance to ensure the long-term 
protectiveness of the radiological remedies (see further information 
in Section 7). As part of this evaluation, the Navy will identify any 
relevant changes in toxicity or other contaminant characteristics 
that may result in post ROD changes. 
Fourth FYR at 6-12. In Section 7 of the Fourth FYR, the Navy stated that it "is in the 
process of conducting a long-term protectiveness evaluation of the ROD radiological 
RGs." ld. at 7-3. In its comments on the draft Fourth FYR, EPA emphasized that "the 
protectiveness determinations requires an updated review of the remedial goals in the 
ROD to determine whether the remedy, upon completion, will be protective of human 
health." Letter from Lily Lee, EPA's RPM, to Derek Robinson, Navy's BRAC 
Environmental Coordinator, dated May 25, 2019, at 2, ~4. However, in the Draft 
Addendum, the Navy did not conduct an evaluation of the ROD's radiological 
remedial goals for soil. Instead, the Draft Addendum simply reiterated, without any 
further review or evaluation, the Remediation Goals adopted in the 2006 Action 
Memorandum. Battelle Report at 3, Table 1. 
According to the Navy's own calculations, which exclude the risk posed by 
consumption of homegrown produce, the excess cancer risk from exposure to both 
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 at the Navy's Remediation Goals exceeds the upper 
bound lifetime cancer risk to an individual of 1 x 1 o-4 established under the NCP to 
protect human health. See Section A.1. below. If the Navy had included the 
consumption of homegrown produce as a risk pathway in its risk calculations, the 
combined risk from Radium-226 and Thorium-232 would exceed the upper bound 
lifetime cancer risk by an order of magnitude. See Section A.2. below. Under these 
circumstances, the Navy's Remediation Goals are not protective of human health. 
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EPA's current residential Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil are substantially 
more stringent than the Navy's soil Remediation Goals, which were derived from 
EPA's 1991 Preliminary Remediation Goals. See Section A.3. below. Because the 
calculated risk associated with the Navy's soil Remediation Goals is outside ofEPA's 
risk range under CERCLA, the Navy should adopt EPA's more protective residential 
Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil, and should amend the RODs for Parcels at 
HPNS to adopt remedies that can meet the more protective Remediation Goals. See 
Section A.4. below. 
1. The Nayy's Remediation Goals for Soil Are Not Protective ofHuman 
Health. 
In the Draft Addendum, the Navy used two models to evaluate the long-term 
protectiveness ofthe soil radiological remedial goals: RESRAD and EPA's PRG 
Calculator. Draft Addendum at 3-4. For both of these calculations, the Navy 
excluded the risk posed by the consumption of homegrown produce at HPNS. Battelle 
Report at 6 (RESRAD modifications); 9 (PRG Calculator modifications). According 
to the Battelle Report, the total risks, without considering the risk posed by the 
consumption of homegrown produce, were calculated as follows: 
TABLE 1-NAVY's ESTIMATED EXCESS CANCER RISKS 
(Excluding Risk of Homegrown Produce) 
Radio nuclide Total Risk Total Risk 
(RESRAD)2 (PRG Calculatol"}3 
Americium-241 7.34E-07 5.95E-07 
Cesium-137 3.22E-06 1.98E-06 
Cobalt-60 1.74E-06 1.09E-06 
Europium-152 5.57E-06 3.36E-06 
Europium-154 7.88E-06 4.87E-06 
Plutonium-239 5.99E-07 6.71E-07 
Radium-226 1.25E-04 7.87E-05 
Strontium-90 8.38E-08 7.87E-08 
Thorium-232 2.75E-04 1.72E-04 
Tritium (H-3) 1.16E-08 9.61E-06 
Uranium-235 1.72E-06 l.OOE-06 
The Battelle Report concluded that the resultant risks under either RESRAD or 
the PRG Calculator "for individual radionuclides or radionuclide decay chains are 
protective for residential exposures to site soils that are uniformly contaminated at the 
remedial goal levels." Battelle Report at 8, 11 (emphasis added). However, 
radionuclide risks are not estimated based on an individual radionuclide or 
radionuclide decay chain. As EPA has explained: "The total incremental lifetime 
2 Battelle Report at 7-8 (Table 3). 
3 Battelle Report at 11 (Table 5). 
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cancer risk attributed to radiation exposure is estimated as the sum of the risks from all 
radio nuclides in all exposure pathways." See "Radiation Risk Assessment at 
CERCLA Sites: Q & A" at 25 (Q28), EPA 540-R-012013 (May 2013) (emphasis 
added) (hereafter "Radiation Risk Assessment Q&A"). In fact, "excess cancer risks 
from both radionuclides and chemical carcinogens should be summed to provide an 
estimate of the combined risk presented by all carcinogenic contaminants." ld. (Q29). 
As EPA stated in its comments regarding the Navy's draft Fourth FYR, 
"EPA's guidance for radiological cleanup states that generally 1 x 104 excess cancer 
risk is an upper bound for risk management decisions." Letter from Lily Lee, EPA's 
RPM, to Derek Robinson, Navy's BRAC Environmental Coordinator, dated May 25, 
2019, at 4, ~11. According to the Navy's own calculations based on RESRAD, the 
excess cancer risk from Radium-226 (1.25E-04) and Thorium-232 (2.75E-04) both 
exceed 1 x 104 ; the excess cancer risk from both radionuclides totals 4.0 x 104 . See 
Table 1 above; Battelle Report at 8. Similarly, based on the Navy's calculations using 
the PRG Calculator, the excess cancer risk from Thorium-232 alone exceeds 1 x 104 , 
and the excess cancer risk from both Radium-226 and Thorium-232 totals 2.5 x 104 . 
See Table 1 above; Battelle Report at 11. These excess cancer risks, calculated by the 
Navy under either RESRAD or the PRG Calculator, exceed the upper bound lifetime 
cancer risk to an individual of 1 x 10-4 established under the NCP to protect human 
health. 40 C.P.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2). 
2. The Nayy's Risk Calculations Understate the Risk of Excess Cancers by 
Omitting the Risk from Consumption of Plants. 
The Battelle Report explained the inputs selected by the Navy to calculate 
excess cancer risks using RESRAD: 
Deed restrictions will be implemented to restrict the growth of plants in 
HPNS soils that are intended for consumption. Residents are therefore 
not anticipated to consume plants, meats, milk, aquatic foods or 
drinking water produced on HPNS and these pathways were turned off. 
Battelle Report at 6. Similarly, the Report described the following modification made 
by the Navy to an input for the PRG Calculator: 
The Toggle All box was unchecked to deselect produce for inclusion in 
the risk estimates based on stated restrictions on the use of homegrown 
produce using HPNS soils. 
ld. at 9 (italics in original). 
In its comments regarding the Navy's draft Fourth FYR, EPA addressed the 
need for the Navy to perform an updated evaluation of long-term protectiveness 
related to cleanup levels, recommending that the Navy's ''technical memorandum 
assess and show the concentrations that would be associated with 1 x 104 excess 
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cancer risk in an unrestricted scenario." Letter from Lily Lee, EPA's RPM, to Derek 
Robinson, Navy's BRAC Environmental Coordinator, dated May 25, 2019, at 4, ~11. 
Instead of responding to EPA's recommendation, the Navy chose to exclude the 
homegrown produce risk from its risk calculations. Notably, the Navy's exclusion of 
the risk from homegrown produce is flatly inconsistent with the Navy's own 
statements about cleanup actions for radiological contaminants. At a Citizens 
Advisory Committee meeting at HPNS on August 26,2019, the Navy provided a fact 
sheet to the public entitled "Facts About Durable Covers and Protecting Health at 
Hunters Point." See Attachment 1. In the fact sheet, the Navy stated: "The cleanup 
actions for radiological contaminants do not rely on the durable cover; instead the 
cleanup goals for these contaminants assume the durable cover is not present." 
Emphasis added. The Navy cannot represent to the public that its cleanup actions for 
radiological contaminants do not rely on durable covers at the same time that the 
Navy's risk calculations for radionuclides intentionally exclude the risk from 
homegrown produce based on the unsupported assumption that "deed restrictions will 
be implemented to restrict the growth of plants in HPNS soils that are intended for 
consumption." Battelle Report at 6. 
In fact, the Institutional Controls selected for Parcels at HPNS do not fully 
support the Navy's assumption. For example, the Explanation of Significant 
Differences ("ESD") for Parcel G, which contains language similar to other HPNS 
RODs, established the following Institutional Control: 
The following activities are prohibited throughout Parcel G: 
Growing vegetables, fruits, or any edible items in native soil for 
human consumption. Plants for human consumption may be grown if 
they are planted in raised beds (above the CERCLA-approved cover) 
containing non-native soil. Trees producing edible fruit (including 
trees producing edible nuts) may also be planted provided they are 
grown in containers with a bottom that prevents the roots from 
penetrating the native soil. 
Parcel G ESD at 8 (April18, 2017) (emphasis added).4 Therefore, the Institutional 
Controls for Parcel G and some other HPNS Parcels expressly permit residents to 
grow plants for human consumption in raised beds. 
4 The Covenant to Restrict the Use ofProperty for Parcels UC-1 and UC-2, which 
was recorded by the San Francisco Assessor-Recorder at the Navy's request on 
September 16, 2015, contains the same Institutional Control language as the ESD for 
Parcel G. Similarly, the Parcel E ROD contains the same Institutional Control 
language as the ESD for Parcel G. Record of Decision for Parcel E (December 2103) 
at 2-56. We note that the Amended ROD for Parcel B does prohibit "growing 
vegetables or fruits in native soil for human consumption." Amended Parcel B Record 
of Decision (January 14, 2009) at 12-11. 
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Moreover, plants grown in raised beds will expose residents to any 
contaminants in the HPNS soil. In an August 2019 report entitled "Plant Uptake of 
Radionuclides and Toxic Chemicals from Contaminated Soils Below a Shallow Soil 
Cover," William Bianchi, PhD, a retired USDA soil physicist, concluded: 
The extensive depth of roots, uptake of contaminants into plants, and 
various mechanisms of hydraulic redistribution allow vegetation to 
access materials such as toxic chemicals and radionuclides deep within 
soil layers. Once accessed, plants are capable of transferring those 
materials through their roots to the surface, providing several pathways 
for human exposure. 
Bianchi Report at 1 (at http://committeetobridgethegap.org/publications/.) 
Because the current Institutional Controls in place in the RODs for Parcels at 
HPNS expressly allow residents to grow and consume their own produce, the Navy 
should have included the risk from homegrown produce in its risk calculations. As the 
risks in Table 2 below illustrate, if produce consumption is included as a risk pathway 
under the PRG Calculator, the total risks are substantially higher for Radium-226 and 
Thorium-232. 
TABLE 2 - COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED EXCESS CANCER RISKS 
(PRG Calculator - Assessing Risk of Consumption of Homegrown Produce) 
Radionuclide Total Risk Excluding Total Risk Including 
Homegrown Produce5 Homegrown Produce6 
Radium-226 7.87E-05 5.48E-04 
Thorium-232 1.72E-04 9.74E-04 
Significantly, according to the PRG Calculator, including produce 
consumption as a risk pathway results in a total excess cancer risk of 1.52 x 1 o-3 from 
both Radium-226 and Thorium-232. Consistent with EPA's guidance, the total risk 
represents the sum of the risks from both radionuclides. See Radiation Risk 
Assessment Q & A at 25 (Q28). This total risk exceeds - by an order of magnitude -
the upper bound lifetime cancer risk to an individual of 1 x 1 0-4 established under the 
NCP to protect human health. 40 C.P.R.§ 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2). 
5 Battelle Report at 11 (Table 5). Note: these calculations exclude the risk from 
consumption of homegrown produce. 
6 United States Environmental Protection Agency: Preliminary Remediation Goals 
for Radionuclide Contaminants at Superfund Sites (date accessed 8-31-19). See 
https://epa-prgs.oml.gov/cgi-binlradionuclides/r_prg search. Note: this risk 
calculation is based on the same inputs as the Battelle Report at page 9 except that the 
risk calculation includes the consumption of homegrown produce. 
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3. EPA's Current Residential Preliminary Remediation Goals for Soil Are 
Substantially More Stringent than the Navy's Soil Remediation Goals. 
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(2), all guidelines, rules, regulations, and 
criteria that are applicable to remedial actions at facilities at which hazardous 
substances are located shall also be applicable to federal facilities such as HPNS. "No 
department ... of the United States may adopt or utilize such guidelines, rules, 
regulations, or criteria which are inconsistent with the guidelines, rules, regulations, or 
criteria established by" EPA under CERCLA. ld. In a 2006 Action Memorandum for 
this site, the Navy adopted Remediation Goals for soil that were derived considering 
the 1991 EPA preliminary remediation goals. Battelle Report at 3. According to the 
PRG Frequently Asked Questions, "the PRG database is updated when new toxicity 
values are presented by the EPA. This is generally done monthly; however, there may 
be times when more than one month passes without the release of updated toxicity 
values." PRG F AQ #7; see https://epa-prgs.ornl.gov/radionuclides/faq.html. The 
Navy has not explained why it chose in 2006 to use EPA's soil preliminary 
remediation goals from 1991 rather than using the soil preliminary remediation goals 
that existed in 2006. As shown in Table 3 below, however, EPA's current residential 
Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil applicable in 2019, calculated at a 10-6 risk 
level, are up to two orders of magnitude more stringent (i.e., more protective) than the 
Navy's Remediation Goals. For example, EPA's residential Preliminary Remediation 
Goal for Radium-226 is 897 times more protective than the Navy's Remediation Goal. 
See D. Hirsch et al., Hunter's Point Shipyard Cleanup Used Outdated and Grossly 
Non-Protective Cleanup Standards at 5 (at 
htt,p://committeetobridgethegap.org/publicationsD (hereafter "Hirsch, Non-Protective 
Cleanup Standards"). Similarly, EPA's current standard for Thorium-232 is 971 times 
more protective than the Navy's Remediation Goal. ld. 
TABLE 3- COMPARISON OF SOIL REMEDIATION GOALS 
Radionuclide Navy's Residential Soil EPA's 2019 Residential 
Remediation Goals (pCi/g) Preliminary Remediation 
Goals for Soil (oCile;)' 
Americium-241 1.36 0.0104 
Cesium-137 0.113 0.0303 
Cobalt-60 0.252 0.00806 
Europium-152 0.13 0.0208 
Europium-154 0.23 0.0195 
Plutonium-239 2.59 0.00615 
Radium-226 1.0 0.00182 
Strontium-90 0.331 0.00361 
Thorium-232 1.69 0.00174 
Tritium (H-3) 2.28 0.0612 
Uranium-235 0.195 0.00623 
7 United States Environmental Protection Agency: Preliminary Remediation Goals 
for Radionuclide Contaminants at Superfund Sites (date accessed 8-28-19). See 
https:/ /epa-prgs.ornl.gov/ cgi -binlradionuclides/rprg_ search. 
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4. The Navy's Five-Year Review Should Recommend the Adoption of 
EPA's More Protective Residential Soil Preliminary Remediation Goals 
and ROD Amendments to Meet the More Protective Remediation Goals. 
The Battelle Report stated that the Remediation Goals for soil "were intended 
to be the most conservative available." Battelle Report at 3 and Table 1. On the 
contrary, these Remediation Goals are far from the "most conservative available." In 
fact, the Navy's Draft Addendum shows that the Remediation Goals are not protective 
of human health. Even if the Navy excludes the risk of consumption of homegrown 
produce, calculations from both RESRAD and PRG Calculator demonstrate that the 
Navy's Remediation goals are not protective because the combined risks from both 
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 exceed the upper bound lifetime cancer risk to an 
individual of 1 x 10-4 established under the NCP. Id. at 7-8 (Table 3); 11 (Table 5). 
Furthermore, if the Navy had properly accounted for the additional risk of 
consumption of homegrown produce, the Navy's Remediation Goals would pose a 
total excess cancer risk of 1.52 x 1 o-3 for Radium-226 and Thorium-232 combined. 
See Table 2 above - Comparison of Estimated Excess Cancer Risks (PRG Calculator-
Assessing Risk of Consumption of Homegrown Produce). 
When the proposed remedy is no longer protective, EPA guidance provides the 
following path forward for the Navy: 
For example, based on revised risk information for a specific chemical, 
a new standard (e.g., more stringent MCL for a chemical) may result in 
a situation where the cleanup level to be achieved by the original 
remedy would pose a 1 o-3 cancer risk. In that circumstance, the five-
year review could recommend that a new cleanup level based on the 
new standard be adopted and, if necessary, that the remedy be 
modified. 
Comprehensive FYR Guidance at 4-6, 4-7. EPA's guidance also sets out a flowchart 
to evaluate changes in standards. Id. at G-4, Exhibit G-1. If the new currently 
calculated risk associated with an old standard is not within EPA's risk range, the "old 
standard is considered not protective" and the "newly revised (protective) standard 
should be adopted." Id. Moreover, the lead agency should determine whether the 
remedy in the ROD can meet the new standards and recommend follow-up actions. 
Id.; see also State of Ohio, 997 F.2d at 1535 (EPA asserting that a five-year review 
may result in a new remedial action "when the review reveals that the remedy is no 
longer protective") (emphasis in original). 
Adoption of EPA's current Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil is 
particularly appropriate at HPNS for several reasons. First, the Navy has determined 
that a significant portion of the radiological survey and remediation work completed to 
date was not reliable because of its contractor's manipulation and/or falsification of 
data. Fourth FYR at 7-3. As a result, extensive survey and remediation work will 
need to be redone at HPNS. Id. This Fourth Five-Year Review requires the Navy and 
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EPA to conduct a long-term protectiveness evaluation ofthe RODs' radiological 
Remediation Goals. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(4)(ii). The 
Navy now has the opportunity to push the "reset button" on the remediation ofHPNS 
in order to regain the public's trust in this process. Second, if the Navy had included 
the risks associated with the consumption of homegrown produce, the PRG Calculator 
reveals that the use of the Navy's Remediation Goals would pose a total excess cancer 
risk of 1.52 x 10"3, i.e., an increased cancer risk of 1.52 in 1,000, which exceeds EPA's 
uppermost risk range by an order of magnitude. Because the Navy's Remediation 
Goals are not protective, the Navy should adopt EPA's current, more protective 
Preliminary Remediation Goals. Third, the Navy's Remediation Goals, which were 
adopted in a 2006 Action Plan, were inexplicably derived from EPA's preliminary 
remediation goals from 1991. Battelle Report at 3. In other words, the Navy's current 
soil Remediation Goals in 2019 are based on a 2006 Action Plan that was derived 
from outdated risk exposure factors from 15 years earlier. If the Navy seeks to assure 
the public that its Remediation Goals for soil are "intended to be the most conservative 
available," it should not cling to outmoded, unprotective standards from 1991 to guide 
the extensive survey and remediation work that remains to be done at HPNS. Finally, 
the Battelle Report states that the current soil Remediation Goal for Radium-226 of 
1.0pCilg above background "is based on an agreement with the EPA." Id. at 3, Table 
1, n.2. However, neither the Navy nor EPA has provided any additional information 
regarding the basis for this agreement; neither the Navy nor EPA has shown the public 
that this Remediation Goal for Radium-226 is protective of human health. 8 
Significantly, EPA's current residential Preliminary Remediation Goal of0.0018 
pCi/g for Radium-226 in soil is 897 times more protective than the Navy's 
Remediation Goal of 1.633 pCilg. See Table 3 above - Comparison of Soil 
Remediation Goals; Hirsch, Non-Protective Cleanup Standards at 5. 
In determining revised remediation goals for soil, the Navy should use the 10-6 risk 
level "as the point of departure." 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2). The most 
protective end of the NCP's risk range is particularly appropriate for HPNS given that 
the State of California has identified Bayview as a disadvantaged community 
"disproportionately affected by environmental pollution and other hazards that can 
lead to negative public health effects, exposure, or environmental degradation." See 
htt,ps://calepa.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017/04/SB-535-Designation-
Final.pdf; https:/ /oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/sb53 5 (OEHHA' s disadvantaged 
communities map). Accordingly, the Navy's Fourth FYR should recommend: (1) the 
adoption ofEPA's more protective residential soil Preliminary Remediation Goals 
(see Table 3 above); and (2) after consideration ofthe nine evaluation criteria 
established by 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii), the amendment of RODs for HPNS 
Parcels to select remedies that can meet the more protective Remediation Goals. 
8 Notably, the ROD for Parcel E identifies Radium-226 as a primary radionuclide of 
concern. ROD for Parcel E (December 2013) at 2-16. 
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B. The Navy's Remediation at HPNS Should Not Rely on Institutional 
Controls Such as Soil Covers and Land Use Controls for Long-lived 
Radionuclides of Concern. 
In a fact sheet entitled "Facts about Durable Covers and Protecting Health at 
Hunters Point" presented to the public at a Citizens Advisory Committee meeting at 
HPNS on August 26, 2019, the Navy stated: "The cleanup actions for radiological 
contaminants do not rely on the durable cover; instead the cleanup goals for these 
contaminants assume the durable cover is not present." See Attachment 1. Contrary 
to the approach announced in the fact sheet, however, the Navy has taken a completely 
different tack in its remedy selection for IR-07/18, which is a part of Parcel B, and for 
Parcel E. 
In the Navy's Fourth FYR, the Navy described the remediation ofiR-07/18, in 
which radiological waste will be left in place in soils below one foot and a cover will 
be an essential part of the remedy: 
In 2010 a MARSSIM Class 1 survey was completed for the entire 
surface ofiR-07/18, and the top 1 foot of soil was remediated to levels 
specified in the Amended ROD to ensure a radiologically clean surface 
before the cover remedy was applied. The constructed cover over the 
portion ofiR-07/18 (within the radiological ARIC) prevents exposure 
to radionuclides in accordance with the RAOs. CDPH completed 
further surface scans at IR-07/18. CDPH concluded that there was no 
evidence or indication of radiological health and safety concerns based 
on surface gamma radiation in the surveyed areas ofiR-07/18 (CDPH, 
2013). Soil data at this site was not evaluated because residual 
radiological contamination is assumed to be present in deeper soils, 
the protective cover was designed to address that residual 
contamination, and the design and integrity of the final soil cover was 
verified by CDPH. 
Fourth FYR at 6-7 (emphasis added). Thus, the Navy intends to prevent potential 
exposure to radionuclides in soil within IR -07118 by "access restrictions," enclosing 
the site with a fence with locked gates, maintaining a durable cover to prevent contact 
with underlying soil, and relying on land use restrictions that will be incorporated into 
a covenant to restrict the use of the property. Id. at 6-8. 
Similarly, the remedy selected for radiological impacted media for Parcel E 
calls for the removal of soil, sediment, or debris with radioactive contamination 
exceeding remediation goals, with soil excavation depth at IR-02 and IR-03 on Parcel 
E generally limited to the upper one foot. ROD for Parcel E (December 2013) at 2-39. 
The Navy intends to construct a two-foot soil cover to prevent exposure to remaining 
contaminants and will impose Institutional Controls to limit the use of land or restrict 
activities that take place within the area. Id. The Navy will conduct "deeper soil 
excavation at IR-02 and IR-03, if necessary, to ensure that the residual radiological 
risk (i.e., the incremental excess cancer risks from exposure to radionuclides in soil) at 
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the final ground surface (following installation of a demarcation layer and soil cover) 
is acceptable." Id. at 2-53. 
Because the Navy's chosen remedy does not allow for unlimited use and 
unrestricted exposure at the site, the NCP requires the Navy to conduct this five-year 
review. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(t)(4)(ii). "When an IC [Institutional Control] is a 
component of a remedial action, the current and long-term effectiveness of that IC 
should be evaluated and relevant information about that IC should be included as part 
ofthe effectiveness determination." See "Recommended Evaluation of Institutional 
Controls: Supplement to the 'Comprehensive Five-Year Review Guidance,"' at 2, 
OSWER Directive 9355.7-18 (September 13, 2011) (hereafter "Recommended IC 
Evaluation"). The five-year review may also "recommend the need for additional 
evaluation and/or follow-up actions included as highlighted issues and 
recommendations." I d. 
In an August 2019 report entitled "Bioturbation, Erosion, and Seismic Activity 
Make Shallow Soil Covers Ineffective at Isolation Contamination," Howard G. 
Wilshire, PhD, a former Senior Geologist at the U.S. Geological Survey, addressed 
whether placing two or three feet of clean soil across large portions of the HPNS site 
could effectively prevent exposure of contaminants to future residents and users of the 
site. Wilshire Report at 1 (at http://committeetobridgethegap.org/publicationsD. He 
concluded: "there is strong evidence that suggests thin soil covers are incapable of 
withstanding certain processes such as bioturbation, erosion, and seismic activity 
which, over time, could potentially compromise their efficacy and durability." Id. In 
particular, Dr. Wilshire listed both burrowing animals and ant species common in the 
Bay Area that could cause extensive damage to soil covers. Id. at 4-5, 7-8. This type 
of damage is not hypothetical; it has been documented at other contaminated sites 
including the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, Rocky Flats Plant, Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. ld. at 3. 
In addition, as the Navy stated in the Historical Radiological Assessment for 
the Hunters Point Shipyard ("HRA"), the HPNS lies between two major faults, the San 
Andreas and the Hayward faults, which "are considered active and likely to experience 
a major event (Richter of magnitude 6.7 or greater) within the next 200 years." HRA 
at 3-3, 3-4. Consequently, HPNS "is situated in a fault zone that can be expected to 
experience violent ground shaking and possible liquefaction of the fill material on 
which much of the shipyard was constructed during a large magnitude earthquake on 
any one of the surrounding faults." ld. at 3-4. In the case of a seismic event, Dr. 
Wilshire stated this concern: "intense shaking and possible liquefaction could very 
well expose contaminated soils beneath the thin soil cover." Wilshire Report at 10. 
Furthermore, an EPA report has documented erosion as a significant problem 
for a number of cover systems. Id. Dr. Wilshire noted that erosion may present a 
particular problem at HPNS, which consists of substantial fill material. ld. Finally, 
plant root intrusion can both transport and disperse waste out of a disposal site, and 
cause physical damage to a cover barrier. Id. at 9. 
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As part of analyzing Institutional Controls in making the protectiveness 
determination in the five-year review, the Navy "should keep in mind that ICs are 
generally protective when they are implemented and effective in the long-term." 
Recommended IC Evaluation at 3. At Parcel E, the ROD identified, based on soil 
sample results, two primary radionuclides of concern: Cesium-13 7 and Radium-226. 
ROD for Parcel E (December 2013) at 2-16. According to the Navy's HRA, Cesium-
137 has a half-life of30.1 years and Radium-226 has a half-life of 1,599 years. HRA, 
Table 4-2 at 1, 2. 
David J. Kappelman, an EPA health physicist, filed a declaration in support of 
the United States' supplemental sentencing memorandum regarding the actions of 
defendant Justin Hubbard at HPNS. In his declaration, Mr. Kappelman stated: 
Because of the possible adverse health effects from ionizing 
radiation and the long decay periods (half-lives) for many 
radionuclides, removal and off-site disposal is considered the 
most effective option for most of the radioactive contaminants 
found at HPNS. For example, the half-life ofradium-226, the 
radionuclide left behind by Mr. Hubbard on the North Pier is 
1 ,600 years. Physical removal of radioactive materials ensures 
that the potential for diffuse radioactivity is reduced to levels 
that meet or are below clean up goals. 
Declaration ofDavid L. Kappelman in Support of Government's Supplemental 
Sentencing Memorandum re: Lack of Sentencing Disparity and Risk of Harm, ~8 
(emphasis added); see Attachment 2 (hereafter "Kappelman Decl."). Physical removal 
and proper off-site disposal of radioactive waste located at HPNS is particularly 
necessary given climate change and the threat of rising sea levels, which would 
inundate radioactive waste left in place at HPNS. 
New York State has issued guidelines providing that the use of a clean soil 
cover may be acceptable as part of a remedy for soil contaminated with short-lived 
isotopes, "assuming that restrictions to land use are used until the radionuclides no 
longer pose a threat." Wilshire Report at 1. That New York State guideline would 
likely rule out the use of a soil cover in this case, in which the soil is contaminated 
with long-lived radionuclides. Id. Similarly, the NCP lists "long-term effectiveness 
and permanence" as a critical factor in selecting a remedy: "Alternatives shall be 
assessed for the long-term effectiveness and permanence they afford, along with the 
degree of certainty that the alternative will prove successful." 40 C.F.R. § 
300.430(e)(9)(iii)(C). In particular, the NCP requires the lead agency to consider the 
"[a]dequacy and reliability of controls such as containment systems and institutional 
controls that are necessary to manage treatment residuals and untreated waste." I d. at 
§ 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(C)(2); see also Recommended IC Evaluation at 6 (in the five-year 
review, EPA should consider the long-term effectiveness and enforceability of 
Institutional Controls). 
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Given the risks posed to the Navy's proposed two-foot soil cover by 
bioturbation, seismic activity, plant intrusion, erosion, and rising sea levels, the Navy 
and EPA should reject the use of a soil cover because it will not prevent exposure to 
soil contaminated with radiological waste in the long term. Considering that Radium-
226, a primary radionuclide of concern at Parcel E, has a half-life of 1,599 years, the 
proposed use of a two-foot soil cover will not protect human health against the effects 
of radioactive contamination at HPNS in the long term. Furthermore, with respect to 
the enforceability of the Institutional Controls to restrict land uses, the California 
Department of Toxic Substances Control does not have an unlimited budget for 
inspectors to monitor and enforce land use controls at HPNS. Even if it did, the 
concept that a land use covenant at HPNS could afford effective and enforceable 
protection in the long term, i.e., for the next two millennia, strains credulity. Because 
the Navy cannot demonstrate the long-term effectiveness of a soil cover to prevent 
human exposure to long-lived radionuclides in the soil at HPNS, the Navy should not 
rely on soil covers and proprietary controls as part of the radiological remedy. As Mr. 
Kappelman declared, "removal and off-site disposal is considered the most effective 
option for most of the radioactive contaminants found at HPNS" to ensure that ''the 
potential for diffuse radioactivity is reduced to levels that meet or are below clean up 
goals." Kappelman Decl., ~8. Instead ofleaving radioactive, contaminated soil on 
site at HPNS, the Navy must conduct a thorough radiological survey at HPNS, and 
remove and properly dispose of HPNS soil contaminated with radiological waste. 
C. The Nayy Should Revise the Protectiveness Determinations in Section 8 of 
Its Fourth Five-Year Review. 
In its Fourth FYR, the Navy included a Protectiveness Statement in Section 8 
for each site or parcel at HPNS where the remedial action is either currently underway 
or is demonstrated to be complete. Fourth FYR at 8-1 to 8-9. The Navy concluded 
that the remedy is "protective" at IR 07/18, "will be protective" at Parcels B-1, B-2, C, 
E, and E-2, and is "short-term protective" at Parcels D-1, D-2, G, UC-1, UC-2, and 
UC-3. Id. As detailed below, the Navy should revise its Protectiveness Statement in 
the Fourth FYR to be consistent with EPA's guidance. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(2). 
In 2012, EPA issued a guidance entitled "Clarifying the Use of Protectiveness 
Determinations for Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act Five-Year Reviews," OSWER 9200.2-111 (9-13-12) (hereafter 
"Protectiveness Determinations Guidance"). To assess the protectiveness of the 
remedy, EPA reiterated that the reviewing agency needs to answer the following three 
questions: 
Question A: Is the remedy functioning as intended by the decision 
documents? 
Question B: Are the exposure assumptions, toxicity data, cleanup 
levels, and RAOs used at the time of the remedy still valid? 
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Id. at 2. 
Question C: Has any other information come to light that could call 
into question the protectiveness of the remedy? 
EPA explained that a determination of"protective" is typically used when the 
answers to the questions A, B, and C "provide sufficient data and documentation to 
conclude that the remedy is functioning as intended and all human and ecological risks 
are currently under control and are anticipated to be under control in the future." ld. at 
2-3. The determination of"will be protective" is appropriate for remedies where 
construction activities are ongoing, the answers to the questions A, B, and C "provide 
sufficient data and documentation to conclude that the human and ecological 
exposures are currently under control and no acceptable risks are occurring," and ''the 
remedy under construction is anticipated to be protective upon completion and no 
remedy implementation or performance issues have been identified." Id. at 3-4. A 
determination of "short-term protective" is typically used when the answers to the 
questions A, B, and C "provide sufficient data and documentation to conclude that the 
human and ecological exposures are currently under control and no unacceptable 
exposures are occurring. However, the data and/or documentation review also raise 
issues that could impact future protectiveness or remedy performance but not current 
protectiveness." ld. at 3. EPA's guidance recommended that the following language 
be used by a lead agency when drafting a protectiveness determination of"short-term 
protective" in a five-year review report: 
The remedy at OU X currently protects human health and the 
environment because (describe the elements of the remedy that protect 
human health and the environment in the short-term). However, in 
order for the remedy to be protective in the long-term, the following 
actions need to be taken (describe the actions needed) to ensure 
protectiveness. 
ld. at 3 (italicized in original).9 
In its Fourth FYR, the Navy stated that "a significant portion of the 
radiological survey and remediation work completed to date was not reliable because 
of manipulation and/or falsification of data by one of its radiological contractors." 
Fourth FYR at 7-3. Under these circumstances, the Navy does not have reliable data 
to respond to Questions B and C with respect to the remedies that the Navy selected 
for each site or parcel at HPNS. Accordingly, the Navy should follow EPA's 
9 For some Parcels at HPNS, the Navy could also determine that "protectiveness 
deferred" is appropriate if the available information to answer the questions A, B, and 
C "does not provide sufficient data and documentation to conclude that the human and 
ecological exposures are currently under control and no unacceptable exposures are 
occurring." Protectiveness Determinations Guidance at 4. 
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Protectiveness Determinations Guidance and revise its protectiveness statement for all 
sites and Parcels at HPNS to properly characterize the protectiveness of the remedy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Navy's own calculations demonstrate that the Navy's Remediation Goals 
are not protective of human health. Because the calculated risk associated with the 
Navy's soil Remediation Goals is outside ofEPA's risk range under CERCLA, the 
Navy should adopt EPA' s more protective residential Preliminary Remediation Goals 
for soil, and should amend RODs for Parcels at HPNS to adopt remedies that can meet 
the more protective Remediation Goals. The Navy should stop relying on soil covers 
and land use restrictions in its remediation of soil contaminated with radiological 
waste at HPNS. Rather than leaving this hazardous waste in place in HPNS soils to 
expose future residents and visitors to the hazards of radiation, the Navy should 
conduct a thorough radiological survey at HPNS, and remove and properly dispose of 
hazardous and radioactive waste located at HPNS. Finally, the Navy should revise the 
Protectiveness Determinations in the Fourth FYR to properly characterize the remedy 
at each Parcel. 
Thank you for your consideration of these comments. If you have any 
questions, you can reach me at (415) 442-6675 or by email at rmullaney@ggu.edu. 
Sincerely, 
Robert D. Mullaney 
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic 
Golden Gate University School of Law 
Attorneys for Greenaction for Health and 
Environmental Justice 
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Public health and safety is the Navy's first priority in the 
cleanup at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard (HPNS). The Navy 
works closely with federal, state and city agencies to ensure 
the safe transfer of HPNS to the City of San Francisco. 
The Navy develops a specific work plan for every parcel 
at HPNS, and each undergoes regulatory review. 
The Navy has successfully remediated and transferred bases 
across the country and leverages its expertise to implement 
protective solutions for each individual facility, including 
Hunters Point. 
One solution used to protect public health and the environment 
is called a "durable cover." Environmental and civil engineers 
determine the correct type of cover- usually pavement or 
soil- and the cover thickness required to ensure public safety. 
Soil cover designs also take into account local seismic stability 
factors to ensure integrity during earthquake events. 
The use of durable covers was determined to be protective 
for certain Hunters Point parcels and approved as part of the 
regulatory process defined by the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Public 
meetings were held to present proposed remedial plans, and 
the selected remedies were then documented in the Records 
of Decision for each Parcel. 
Durable cover solutions are in place at Parcels B, C, D-1, D-2, 
E, G, UC-1, UC-2 and UC-3 as permanent protective measures 
to ensure public safety by preventing exposure to naturally 
occurring asbestos, metals and any remain ing contamination 
in soil. The r:leanup actions for radiolooical contaminants do not 
rely on the durable cover; instead the deanuo aoals for these 
contaminants assume the durable cover is not present. 
To ensure that the covers are not disturbed and remain protective, 
the Navy monitors and maintains them through regular 
inspections of soil and pavement conditions, cracks in building 
foundations, settlement, accumulation of surface water, signs 
of erosion, the condition of survey benchmarks and signs of 
vandalism. The durable covers are also assessed as part of the 
Five-Year Review process under CERCLA to ensure that they will 
continue to be protective of human health and the environment. 
After property is transferred to civilian control, the city can 
develop the property in accordance with regulatory procedures 
and controls that take the durable covers into account. 
Additionally, the requirement to inspect and maintain the durable 
covers continues after property conveyance and development. 
. : FAQ -: . . . .. . . . ·. ·--·:· 
Is the Navy's use of covers new 
at Hunters Point? 
Durable covers have been used for 
many years at HPNS. These covers 
were approved as part of the standard 
regulatory process that includes 
community input before decisions 
were finalized. 
Once homes are built, could 
residents' gardens and plants 
bring contamination from 
underground to the surface? 
No. When HPNS parcels are 
transferred and developed, 
gardening and other intrusive 
activities into the durable cover will 
be prohibited in a binding land use 
control legal covenant. 
What happens if a cover is damaged 
due to animal or seismic activity? 
Covers are inspected regularly by the 
Navy. Whenever problems are found, they 
are corrected. After property transfer, 
the inspection and maintenance 
requirement will continue with the 
city, developer or other associations 
depending on the location. 
More information about the Navy's cleanup work at Hunters Point is available at bracpmo.navy.mi l/hpnsrc. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JUSTIN E. HUBBARD, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR 17-278 JD 
DECLARATION OF DAVID J. KAPPELMAN 
1N SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING 
MEMORANDUM RE: LACK OF 
SENTENCING DISPARITY AND RISK OF 
HARM 
Date: March 21, 2018 
Time:· 1 0:30am 
1. I make this declaration in support of the Government's Memorandum Regarding 
16 Sentencing Disparity. 
17 2. I am a health physicist with the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 
18 I have been so employed since March 1995. I have a Bachelor of Science de~ree in Electrical and 
1 ~ Electronic Engineering from the California State University of Sacramento. I have worked as a Nuclear 
20 Engineer or Health Physicist since March 1992. I have training and experience in radiological detection 
21 and quantification. I have performed Gamma Spectroscopy on environmental matrices (soil, water, air, 
22 etc.) and on performance evaluation samples while employed by the EPA National Air and Radiation 
23 Environmental Laboratory and was the Deputy Team Commander of the Radiological Emergency 
24 Response Team responding to radiation emergencies nationwide. I currently work for the EPA 
25 Environmental Response ·Team assisting EPA regions with Superfund radiological emergency response, 
26 site investigations, cleanups, and oversight nationwide. I have been assisting EPA Region 9 with 
27 reviewing prior documentation and new U.S. Navy work plans to verify that the Navy's radiological 
28 
1 cleanup meets the release criteria specified in the EPA Record of Decision for Hunters Point Naval 
2 Shipyard. 
3 3. Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, (HPNS), is a Superfund site located in southeastern San 
4 Francisco, California, and was first listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) in 1989. The NPL is a 
5 list of Superfund Sites that are given national priority for cleanup, based upon an assessment of the level 
6 of threat posed to human health or the environment from known or threatened releases of hazardous 
7 substances or pollutants at the site. The HPNS is currently owned by the U.S. Navy, which is the lead 
8 agency responsible for the cleanup. In addition to serving as a repair facility for the U.S. Navy, the· 
9 HPNS Superfund Site was the location for the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory (NRDL), 
10 operated by the Navy, from 1948 to 1969. The work at NRDL included radiological decontamination of 
11 ships exposed to atomic weapons testing as well as research and experiments on radiological 
12 decontamination and the effect of radiation on living organisms and materials. 
13 4. The Superfund investigation and cleanup of contamination at HPNS is a multi-phase 
14 project that has b~en on-going for more than 20 years. After a comprehensive historical assessment, the 
.15 Navy identified 84 areas that either were contaminated or had the potential to be contaminated by 
16 radiological materials. The radionuclide contaminants at the Site that pose a threat to human health and 
17 the environment include, among others, radium-226, plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium-137. 
18 The Navy addressed each area through a time critical removal action to immediately identify and 
19 remove the radioactive contamination in soil, debris, and buildings base-wide. Tetra Tech, EC Inc. 
20 (TtEC) was the contractor hired by the Navy to perform this portion of the cleanup. TtEC provided 
21 radiological investigation and remediation services to the Navy at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard from 
22 2003 to 2014. 
23 5. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease ~egistry (ATSDR) provides the following 
24 information on radium-226, plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium 137, the radionuclides of concern: 
25 a. Radium-226 is one of the two main isotopes of radium found in the environment. Radium is a 
26 radioactive substance formed from the breakdown of uranium and thorium. Radium has been shown to 
27 cause effects on the blood (anemia) and eyes (cataracts). It also has been shown to affect the teeth, 
28 
1 causing an increase in broken teeth and cavities. Exposure to high levels of radium results in an 
2 increased incidence ofbone, liver, and breast cancer. The EPA and the National Academy of Sciences, 
3 Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, have stated that radium is a known human 
4 carcinogen. 
5 b. Plutonium is a radioactive material that is produced in nuclear reactors; only trace ~aunts 
6 occur naturally. The most common plutonium isotope is plutonium-239. The main health effect from 
7 exposure to plutonium is cancer which may occur years after exposure. The types of cancers most likely 
8 to develop are cancers of the lung, bones, and liver. The Department of~ealth and Human Services 
9 (DllliS), International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), and the EPA's Office of Air and 
10 Radiation (OAR) consider plutonium to be a human carcinogen. 
11 c. Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope of strontium, is formed in nuclear reactors or during the 
12 explosion of nuclear weapons. Radioactive strontium generates beta particles as it decays. Exposure to 
13 stable or radioactive strontium occurs from ingesting contaminated food or drinking water or breathing 
14 contaminated air. High levels of radioactive strontium can cause anemia or cancer. The International 
15 Agency for Research on Cancer (JAR C) has determined that radioactive strontium is a human 
16 carcinogen. 
17 d. Two radioactive forms of cesium~ including cesium-13 7 are produced by nuclear explosions 
18 or the breakdown of uranium in fuel elements. Cesium binds strongly to moist soils and does not travel 
19 far below the surface of the soil. One can be exposed to radioactive cesium by eating food that was 
20 grown in contaminated soil, or by coming near a source of radioactive cesium. Exposure to large 
21 amounts of radioactive cesium damages cells from the radiation. Acute radiation syndrome can occur, 
22, which includes nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, bleeding, coma, and even death incases ofvery high 
23 exposures. 
24 6. During the relevant period, Justin Hubbard and Stephen Rolfe were two Tetra Tech 
25 Radiological Task Supervisors who oversaw all the field sampling necessary to determine the scope and 
26 extent of radiological contamination under the Navy's and Tetra Tech's work plans. Justin Hubbard was 
27 responsible for overseeing sampling at numerous locations, including the North Pier. Historically, Berth 
28 
1 6, 7, 8, and 9 at the North Pier were used for berthing ships associated with radiological actiyities, 
2 including Operation Crossroads, NRDL experimental and waste disposal barges. Operation Crossroad 
3 ships were contaminated by radioactivity during atomic bomb testing at the Bikini Atoll in 1946. 
4 Hundreds of ships became contaminated, the most heavily impacted of which were sent to HPNS for 
5 decontamination. 
6 7. ·Justin Hubbard admitted to falsifying samples taken at the North Pier on May 31, 2012, 
7 from four separate survey units. The total number of samples falsifi~d from these four survey units was 
8 approximately 80. These were samples taken for the final survey, meaning, if the sample dirt passed the 
9 standard for release, the area was deemed "clean" freeing it up for eventual release by the Navy to 
10 · civilian authorities. It was only the action of the Navy catching the falsification that caused the areas to 
11 be re~sampled. Re-sampling determined that excessive levels of radiation remained after fraudulently 
12 being deemed clean by Tetra Tech employees, including Justin Hubbard. One of the survey units 
13 deemed clean by Justin Hubbard, Survey Unit 1, required multiple additional survey sampling and two 
14 additional dirt removals before it finally met the release criteria for radium-226, that is 1 pico curie per 
15 gram orless. 
16 8. Because of the possible adverse health effects from ionizing radiation and the long decay 
17 periods (half-lives) for many radionuclides, removal and off-site disposal is considered the most 
18 effective option for most of the radioactive contaminants found at HPNS. For example, the half-life of 
19 radium-226, the radionuclide left behind by Mr. Hubbard on the North Pier is 1,600 years. Physical 
20 removal of radioactive materials ensures that the potential for diffuse radioactivity is reduced to levels 
21 that meet or are below clean up goals. 
22 
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